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•  Ensuring migrants have access to appropriate and secure legal status can help achieve 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies.
•  If granted, permanent residency and/or citizenship can help foster integration. If access is denied, 
it can lead to tensions between migrants and host communities, further marginalise migrants, and 
hinder progress towards SDG 16.7.
•  Numerous barriers prevent long-term migrants from accessing permanent residency and/or 
citizenship, including political feasibility, racial, religious and gender bars, stringent language tests, 
and high costs. These barriers should be removed, or made more flexible.
•  Second-generation migrants are particularly affected because they are often excluded from full 
membership of the communities they have lived in all their lives. States should explore granting full 
citizenship at birth, or soon after.
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1 Introduction 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 calls on states to 
‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development, provide access to justice for all, and build 
effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels’. This briefing considers how ensuring migrants have 
fair access to appropriate and secure legal status, through 
permanent residency and/or citizenship, can help achieve 
this Goal.  
Granting permanent residency and/or citizenship 
to migrants can help foster integration and promote 
‘peaceful and inclusive societies’. If such integration is not 
fostered, it can lead to tensions between migrant and host 
communities. We argue that the links between migration 
and specific Targets should be considered; specifically, 16.3 
on the rule of law and access to justice, 16.4 on organised 
crime, 16.5 on corruption and bribery, 16.7 on responsive, 
inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making, 
and 16.9 on legal identity. Ignoring these linkages will 
jeopardise the achievement of these Targets. 
This briefing begins by defining key concepts. Section 3 
outlines the evidence linking citizenship and integration. 
Section 4 shows common requirements for, and barriers to, 
accessing citizenship. Section 5 considers the implications 
of not giving migrants access to permanent residency and/
or citizenship – the potential for tensions and conflict. 
Section 6 draws out implications for the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), specifically 
the specific Targets included in Goal 16. The final section 
concludes and draws out specific policy recommendations.
2 Defining key concepts
Citizenship is broadly defined as membership of a self-
governing political community, bringing with it rights 
and obligations for both the citizen and their community 
(Stanford, 2017). Citizenship, permanent residency and 
other forms of legal status are usually considered to 
encompass a formal legal relationship with a state. Yet 
1. The idea of mutual consent may also be used to justify the deprivation of citizenship by the state. Although the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness prohibits deprivation of nationality if it would lead to statelessness, in recent years countries including the United Kingdom (UK) have 
enacted and used provisions which allow them to denationalise dual nationals (mostly in terror cases) (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 1961: 
Article 8; Travis, 2017).
citizenship also connects to wider ideas about belonging 
to, and participating in, more local forms of community 
(see Holston and Appadurai, 1996). Importantly, although 
citizenship status is primarily acquired through birth, 
nearly all states also recognise the idea that citizenship rests 
on consent, so that it is possible for newcomers to become 
citizens in their host community by mutual agreement.1 
Citizenship is not the only form of secure legal status 
available to migrants. In many countries, migrants are 
able to apply for permanent residency (sometimes called 
‘indefinite leave to remain’) without having to take on all 
the obligations – or be granted all the rights – associated 
with citizenship (for example, permanent residents may not 
be required to complete military service, and are usually 
not permitted to vote). This is often required as an interim 
stage before full citizenship, marking an incremental 
expansion of migrants’ rights over time. 
Broader than formal citizenship or other forms of 
legal status is the concept of integration. In this paper, 
integration is understood as a two-way, long-term 
incremental process that goes beyond fostering simple 
tolerance and absence of conflict (between different groups 
of people in social, economic and political spheres). It 
involves the active mixing of people who hold different 
identities, helping to foster shared collective values and 
practices of ‘belonging’ (Ager and Strang, 2008). Some 
analysts prefer to use the term ‘inclusion’ to underline 
that this idea of belonging does not rest upon ‘one-
way assimilation’ (Rudiger and Spencer, 2003). In this 
paper, the terms integration and inclusion will be used 
interchangeably. 
Host states do not expect all migrants to integrate (see 
Ruhs, 2013). Similarly, migrants’ interests in and need 
to ‘belong’ to the host community vary substantially 
depending on the purpose of their migration, which 
itself may change over time. At one end of the spectrum, 
seasonal workers are generally expected to stay in a 
fixed location and have minimal engagement with local 
community. At the other extreme, migrants who arrive 
through family channels are normally presumed to be 
settling permanently in their country of arrival. 
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Most labour and student migrants can be considered 
a middle group. On the one hand, very few are admitted 
with permanent rights to stay in a country of destination, 
and many are only allowed to stay temporarily while 
they complete a course of study or work for a particular 
company.  On the other hand, many workers and students 
may find themselves settling in a destination country 
indefinitely, either by initial design, or because their plans 
change. 
Finally, there are second-generation migrants, who are 
born in a host country to immigrant parents (or arrive as 
small children), and may never have lived in their ‘home’ 
state. While a few states (the United States (US), Canada) 
still offer unconditional jus soli/ birthright citizenship to 
those born on their territory, most countries restrict access 
to citizenship based on the parent’s legal status or length of 
residency. 
3 Links between citizenship and integration
Many argue that citizenship should not be viewed as an 
end in itself but as a crucial means to secure full inclusion 
and integration in a community (Massey and Bartley, 
2005; Portes et al., 2009). Citizenship is often presented 
as the end-point of this process, as a reward for successful 
integration and confirmation of the host community’s 
willingness to accept a new member. Those without such 
status may be prevented from accessing education and 
health services, jobs and welfare benefits (Spencer, 2006). 
These are widely recognised as critical factors for migrants’ 
inclusion (UK Home Office, 2004).
Evidence shows the positive effect naturalisation has 
on the labour market, with migrants’ gaining greater 
employability and higher wages after naturalisation 
(Peters and Vink, 2016; Bauböck et al., 2013). This 
is partly because the new status removes restrictions 
on public-sector and other jobs, and partly because a 
naturalised migrant is perceived as less risky to hire. 
In Germany, a study found that immigrant women 
experienced higher wages and improved labour-market 
outcomes after naturalisation, mainly because they were 
able to switch to jobs with permanent contracts and in 
larger firms (Gathmann and Keller, 2014). These effects 
are important for integration prospects; labour-market 
integration enables greater economic and social inclusion, 
through improved access to decent accommodation and 
healthcare (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)/European Union (EU), 2015). 
While labour-market outcomes are important markers 
of migrants’ integration, they are only one aspect of it. 
2. Citizenship by registration can be claimed if a migrant meets criteria that tend to be linked to pre-existing connections between a state and the applicant. 
It is particularly relevant when dealing with diaspora (re)migration, and migration as a result of marriage.
3. Only a very few states, including Myanmar and Lebanon, have a total or near-total bar on naturalisation. However, in practice many countries make 
naturalisation difficult for long-term migrants, through a combination of stringent criteria, high fees and arbitrary administrative procedures.
There is also evidence of a positive relationship between 
naturalisation and political integration. For example, 
a study across 19 European countries showed that 
citizenship acquisition increased political participation, 
especially for migrants who grew up in non-democratic 
settings (Just and Anderson, 2012). In Switzerland, 
naturalisation improved political integration as immigrants 
attained higher levels of political knowledge (Hainmueller 
et al., 2015). 
4 Citizenship requirements and barriers
A migrant may be able to acquire citizenship through 
registration,2 naturalisation3 or investment. There is a 
general consensus that it is reasonable a migrant should 
demonstrate a genuine connection with the community 
they hope to join when applying for permanent residency 
and/or citizenship. Most states require applicants to 
demonstrate a period of residency, basic linguistic and 
cultural knowledge, and that they are of good character. 
Many states also charge fees.  
Some states run ‘citizenship by investment’ programmes, 
which allow for citizenship (or, more often, permanent 
residency) to be fast-tracked or acquired outright in 
exchange for a financial investment. Such programmes 
– especially in less-developed countries like Antigua, the 
Comoros or the Dominican Republic – are often claimed to 
have an explicit ‘development’ objective, bringing income 
into the state.  Yet pursuing development though the sale 
of citizenship raises difficult questions about the nature of 
sustainable development, inclusion and belonging. 
Traditionally, citizenship was viewed as a unitary 
status, so that acquiring a new citizenship required the 
relinquishing of a previous one. However, as the number of 
international migrants and their descendants has increased, 
so too have the number of dual nationals, or people 
formally recognised as holding two or more citizenships. 
Some states, such as the Netherlands and India, do not 
recognise dual nationality, and require migrants who 
naturalise to give up the citizenship of their country of 
origin. Others have introduced new provisions to allow 
diaspora members to keep or reclaim citizenship. These 
policies are explicitly intended to encourage greater 
economic, cultural and social links between diaspora 
communities and origin countries by facilitating easier 
mobility and a sense of continued belonging (Faist and 
Kivisto, 2007). 
The rest of this section discusses barriers to permanent 
residency and/or citizenship faced by migrants in host 
communities, and potential policy solutions.
4.1 Political feasibility
Human-rights advocates argue that long-term migrants, 
once admitted legally, should not be denied the right to 
secure legal status and citizenship over time. However, in 
many states, granting citizenship to migrants is politically 
contentious. This is especially true if there are large 
numbers of migrants who are eligible to naturalise, as this 
may stoke fears that social identity and cohesion could 
be lost. ‘Demographic bomb’ narratives are the core of 
a number of political debates, including fears expressed 
about Palestinian Israelis, Roma in Slovakia and Latinos in 
the US.
In some cases, such concerns arise because migrants 
were not originally expected to remain permanently in 
the host country when they were admitted. It took several 
decades for Germany, for instance, to recognise that 
Turkish guest workers and their German-born children 
were not likely to return home. In the United Kingdom 
(UK), British citizenship and rights of residency were 
increasingly restricted after large numbers of migrants 
from the former British Empire arrived between the 1950s 
and the 1970s (Weil, 2001).  
This problem is compounded where a state understands 
membership in explicitly ethnic or indigenous terms. In 
these situations, such as in many Gulf States, collective 
national identity requires citizenship to be strictly 
restricted. Some states have taken involved measures to 
protect this ‘national’ ideal. For instance, in 2014 Kuwait 
attempted to buy Comoros passports for stateless Bedouin 
groups in its territory, in order to avoid having to recognise 
them as Kuwaiti citizens (Abrahamian, 2015; Mansour-Ille 
2016). 
Granting citizenship to migrants may also prove 
politically complex in cases where a migrant group is 
associated with historic oppression. Latvians’ reluctance 
to recognise Russian-speakers as citizens, for instance, 
stems from the Soviet Union’s long occupation of the 
country (Weil, 2001). In other cases, granting citizenship 
to a particular group of migrants may be feared because of 
divisions within multinational states and concerns that new 
citizens may shift political power or encourage separatism. 
Kenyan reluctance to offer Somali migrants and refugees 
citizenship can be explained in part by the state’s difficult 
relationship with the Kenyan Somali community (Manby, 
2016).
In the case of mass influx of refugees, the politics of 
granting citizenship is still more complex. Host states 
did not choose to admit these arrivals, and do so as a 
humanitarian duty. Offering hundreds of thousands of 
refugees citizenship en masse is usually politically fraught, 
especially in states like Lebanon where inter-community 
politics are already extremely fragile and demographic 
shifts could incite serious violence.  
4.2 Legal status
The ability to apply for permanent residency or citizenship 
is universally premised on having arrived as a legal migrant 
and remained in the country as such. For millions of 
migrants who do not hold, or cannot prove, legal status, 
this can create an insurmountable obstacle. 
While this group includes irregular migrants, it is not 
limited to them. Migrants who have travelled to live and 
work in countries where there are reciprocal rights of 
free movement, for instance, may not always have the 
paperwork to prove their right to residency or citizenship. 
This has recently become an issue for EU citizens in the 
UK in the wake of Brexit (Box 3), but has also caused 
difficulties in the past for citizens moving in the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region (Box 
1).  
4.3 Racial, religious and gender bars
In some cases, constitutional bars prevent migrants who 
do not belong to a specified racial or religious group 
from becoming citizens of the country in which they have 
settled. The Liberian constitution, for instance, specifies 
that all applicants for citizenship must be ‘negro or of 
negro descent’, effectively barring non-black residents from 
acquiring citizenship. This excludes Liberia’s Lebanese 
Box 1: Reciprocal rights in ECOWAS 
Many regional trade blocs offer citizens of member 
countries reciprocal rights to live, work and study 
across a region. Although regional or supranational 
citizenship is a relatively new concept (most fully 
developed in the setting of the EU) a number of 
emerging regional citizenship groups are emerging 
(Long, 2015). 
ECOWAS was founded in 1975. In 1979 the 
Community adopted a Free Movement Protocol 
giving all citizens of member states the right to 
enter, reside and work across the community. 
The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol still faces 
many challenges. Immigration officials in member 
states are sometimes unaware (or unwilling to 
recognise) that ECOWAS nationals holding valid 
documents can enter their country freely. And 
ECOWAS rights are not equivalent to national 
membership. For example, in 2002 questions 
regarding national citizenship (and the refusal to 
offer this to the descendent of migrants from other 
West African states) played a role in precipitating 
civil war in the Cote d’Ivoire. 
Nevertheless, ECOWAS offers a possible model 
for balancing the needs of migrants for reciprocal 
rights to foster peaceful and inclusive societies, with 
concerns about protecting national identities (see 
Manby, 2015). 
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population, who have been settled in the state since the 
1960s.
In 2003, Israel passed a Citizenship and Entry law 
that restricted access to citizenship (and residency) for 
all Palestinians with a West Bank or Gaza identity card, 
including those with an Israeli spouse. In 2007 the 
provisions were expanded to apply to non-Jewish citizens 
of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria marrying Israeli Jews 
(Amnesty International, 2017). Similarly many Gulf 
countries make it difficult for non-Muslims to acquire 
citizenship, and by law Saudi Arabia requires all citizens to 
be Muslim (US State Department, 2005).
Gender discrimination can intersect with migration 
to create barriers to citizenship, particularly for the 
children of mixed citizen-migrant marriages. In 2014, 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) launched the #IBelong campaign, advocating 
for the removal of gender discrimination in in 27 states 
where nationality laws currently prevent women married 
to foreigners from passing on their citizenship to their 
children. In 2017, Madagascar became the first country on 
the list to amend its nationality law (UNHCR, 2017). 
4.4 Excessive residency requirements
Some states require migrants to prove extremely long-term 
residency in order to qualify for citizenship. In the Central 
African Republic, for instance, applicants may be required 
to show as many as 35 years (Manby, 2016). Bureaucratic 
delays and quotas can also hamper applications in 
developed states, sometimes exacerbating ethnic and racial 
disparities in access. 
Laws may explicitly seek to prevent migrants who 
arrived as refugees from naturalising, particularly in cases 
of mass influx of refugees. In Uganda, for instance, the 
government has repeatedly resisted attempts by long-
term refugees to naturalise. A 2015 High Court decision 
determined that refugees could not be barred from 
applying for naturalisation, but refugee advocate groups 
complain that in practice, administrators refuse to provide 
refugees with the necessary forms (International Refugee 
Rights Initiative (IRRI), 2016). Tanzania, on the other 
hand, is an example of a country that has given citizenship 
for long-term refugees on a large scale (Box 2). 
4.5 Stringent language and citizenship tests
Many locals feel permanent residents and new citizens 
should speak some form of lingua franca. However, 
some states insist that migrants applying for citizenship 
must pass complex language exams that go beyond the 
skills needed for everyday communication. For instance, 
Botswana requires knowledge of Setswana or another 
language spoken by a ‘tribal’ community (Manby, 2016). 
A number of countries – mostly developed states – also 
require applicants to pass a citizenship exam. Some of 
these exams have been deliberately designed to be difficult 
for immigrants to pass, with questions on trivia that are 
irrelevant to migrants’ everyday inclusion. The Danish 
citizenship test, for instance, was revised in 2016, as part 
of a raft of measures intended to cut immigration after 
a surge of support for anti-immigrant political parties 
(Delman, 2016). It includes questions such as ‘Which 
Danish restaurant gained a third Michelin star in February 
2016?’. 
4.6 High costs
The monetary cost of applying for citizenship varies 
considerably. In Japan, although cultural requirements 
are strictly enforced, the naturalisation process is free. 
However, Kenya levies a fee of KSHS500,000 (US$4,800), 
3.5 times Kenya’s per-capita gross domestic product (GDP). 
The UK has also been criticised for disproportionately 
high citizenship fees (Economist 2017). One consequence 
of such high costs is that permanent residency and 
citizenship become unaffordable ‘luxuries’ for less wealthy 
migrants; the high cost of US naturalisation (US$680), for 
example, is one reason a number of migrants chose not 
to apply for citizenship even when they can meet other 
criteria (Gonzales-Barera et al., 2013). Unable to afford 
naturalisation, poorer migrants remain on temporary 
visas, without protection against deportation (Taylor et al., 
2012).   
Box 2: Tanzanian citizenship for Burundian 
refugees
In 1972, Tanzania received tens of thousands of 
refugees from Burundi and settled them in three 
rural settlements. Over the years, refugees integrated 
with the host communities and began to contribute 
significantly to the local economy. Today, over 
85% of the inhabitants in these settlements were 
born in Tanzania. Nonetheless, the second and 
third generation of Burundian refugees continue 
to live with refugee status and no prospects for 
naturalisation. 
In 2007, the government of Tanzania, in 
partnership with the government of Burundi and 
UNHCR, designed the Tanzania Comprehensive 
Solutions Strategy. This comprised three key 
elements: voluntary repatriation, application 
for naturalisation, and final local integration 
in Tanzania. To date, 151,019 certificates have 
been distributed to individuals who opted for 
naturalisation, and over 53,000 refugees have 
returned to Burundi (UNHCR, 2014).
5 Tensions arising from lack of citizenship
When immigration policy changes, prior acquisition of 
permanent residency or citizenship (and even migrant 
parents’ and grandparents’ citizenship) can become an 
essential protection against deportation and discrimination. 
The surge in EU nationals applying for UK citizenship 
post-2015 (see Box 3) and in naturalisation rates in the 
US among eligible Green Card holders since the 2016 
Presidential election, reflect these concerns (Tolan, 2017).
The inability of long-term migrants, including second-
generation ‘migrants’ born in their host country, to acquire 
citizenship in their host community can result in exclusion 
and deprive migrants of fundamental rights, as well as 
contribute to inter-community tensions and conflict. 
The case of Turkish migrants and their descendants in 
Germany, who until the 1990s were unable to become 
citizens under German law and who as a result struggled 
to integrate into German communities, is one well-
known example of barriers to citizenship preventing full 
inclusion.4 
In the most extreme cases, violence follows government 
decisions to strip citizenship from the descendants of 
migrants. In 2013, for example, the Dominican Republic’s 
Constitutional Court revoked citizenship for children 
born to foreign parents as far back as 1929, as part of a 
long-running ‘anti-Haitianismo’ political movement in the 
country inspired by racial, linguistic and socio-economic 
prejudice (Hindin and Ariza, 2016). This affected a large 
proportion of the 240,000 Dominicans of Haitian descent 
in the country5 who were left without the right to work, 
services and more. It provoked huge social and political 
disquiet, with large-scale protests in Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic and across the US (Constable, 2015; Semple, 
2013). 
5.1 Political exclusion 
Many migrants have limited political rights in their host 
country: the ability to vote (especially at the national level) 
and to run for office is usually limited to citizens alone. 
One consequence is that migrants – including long-term 
migrants with permanent residency and their families – 
have no right of political participation and very little direct 
political power to influence community decision-making. 
Policies excluding migrants may prove popular with a non-
migrant electorate or avoid close scrutiny, because migrants 
must rely upon proxy representation (for instance, family 
who do hold citizenship) in order to influence the outcome 
of political debate. The relatively progressive nature of 
4. This is not to suggest that citizenship is the only factor in fostering integration and inclusion. As a counter-example, despite French citizenship being 
relative easy for immigrants to acquire, and French identity being understood in non-ethnic terms, France has struggled with the marginalisation and 
segregation of migrant and second-generation citizens.
5. Their situation was further complicated as they could not resettle in Haiti; foreign-born individuals are only eligible for Haitian citizenship if one parent is 
a natural-born Haitian citizen.
the US debate on immigration regularisation – where a 
majority of those surveyed continue to favour a pathway 
to citizenship for irregular migrants who meet certain 
criteria – can be partly attributed to the irregular migrants 
who have close friends and family with citizenship, and 
who are an increasingly important political bloc (Branton, 
2007). 
More serious tensions can arise when governments deny 
political rights to individuals who have a long-standing 
claim to that country and/or previously enjoyed these 
rights. This is the case for the long-established Nepali 
community in Bhutan (Box 4), and for approximately 
300,000 ethnic Russians in Latvia, who, despite having 
been born or lived in the country for decades, remain 
non-citizens without political rights. Debate over their 
status is heated. In 2012, 75% of the electorate rejected 
a proposal to recognise Russian as a national language in 
the constitution, even though a third of Latvia’s population 
speak it as their mother tongue (Cianetti, 2014; Schmid, 
2008).
Box 3: EU citizens in the UK after Brexit
In June 2016 the UK decided to leave the EU, 
resulting in uncertainty for millions of EU citizens 
living in the UK. Key issues at stake include their 
continued right to work, families potentially being 
split up, and access to pensions and healthcare 
(House of Commons, 2017). There are also 1.2 
million UK citizens living in EU countries with 
similar concerns (ibid). 
After Brexit, EU citizens rushed to secure 
their status in the UK; over 90,000 applied for 
a ‘permanent residence’ card in 2016 (Ryan, 
2017) and capacity to handle these was low. It 
was estimated it would take 140 years to process 
applications (Migration Observatory, 2016). At the 
end of 2016, 29% of claims were rejected (Elgot, 
2017). The process was eventually declared ‘not fit 
for purpose’ by a parliamentary committee (House 
of Commons, 2017). 
For many EU citizens who have established their 
lives – legally studying, working, paying taxes and 
starting families – the continued uncertainty is 
disruptive. Many have voiced anger at being used 
for political bargaining in Brexit negotiations, while 
others have reported anxiety and feeling unwelcome 
in the UK (House of Commons, 2017; O’Carroll, 
2016). 
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5.2 Access to justice
Non-citizens can struggle to secure access to justice. 
Although citizens are normally guaranteed legal counsel 
if they are arrested, this right often does not extend to 
non-citizens, particularly those whose status is irregular. 
Australia, for instance, does not guarantee legal counsel 
for anyone detained under the Migration Act (Congress, 
2017). 
Tensions around legal access and due process for non-
citizens are amplified for low-skilled workers. Given that 
many migrants are in low-skilled employment, it makes 
this group particularly vulnerable. This double bar has 
affected low-skilled migrants in some Middle Eastern and 
Asian countries, where alleged violations have led to local 
and national tensions. 
Migrants have also protested against seasonal and 
temporary workers’ programmes that offer no opportunity 
to accumulate a more permanent residency status and that 
can leave workers open to abuse. In 2010, hundreds of 
6. For more information on migration and access to services, see the other briefings in this series: education (Nicolai et al., 2017); health (Tulloch et al., 
2016); and social protection (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017a).
Guatemalans gathered to protest against abusive working 
conditions of Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker system 
(Market Wire, 2010).   
5.3 Access to education, healthcare and other 
services6 
Decisions by states to limit entitlements to permanent 
residents and citizens are, in the first instance, relatively 
uncontroversial. However, second-generation migrants 
unable to claim citizenship can be particularly affected 
by limited access to subsidised education or healthcare 
programmes. This issue has been especially prominent 
in the US, where 20 states now allow undocumented 
immigrant students who have graduated from high school 
to benefit from in-state tuition rates (National Conference 
of State Legislatures (NCSL), 2015).
Another group whose exclusion from services can 
be problematic are refugees, and those who arrived 
involuntarily in a state. In developed regions, recognised 
refugees (though not asylum-seekers) are usually provided 
with immediate access to most state services. In contrast, in 
many developing regions states have pursued deliberately 
hostile policies aimed at the long-term exclusion of 
refugees. For instance, Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan 
face a number of prohibitions that contribute to economic 
isolation, including no or limited access to the formal 
labour market (Domat, 2016). Support to refugees in 
these contexts is mostly provided through humanitarian 
agencies. Covering vulnerable citizens and non-citizens in 
parallel systems diminishes any social-cohesion effects to 
be gained from joint access (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017b). 
5.4 Lack of integration prospects
A lack of permanent status and/or citizenship can lead 
to general unrest in local communities, and the further 
marginalisation of migrants. In these cases, lack of 
citizenship is rarely an explicit cause of unrest, but rather a 
contributor to migrant-local tensions and failed inclusion. 
Such protests can be migrant-led, such as the violent 
riots in Paris in 2005 (Schneider, 2008). Most common, 
however, are anti-migrant and/or anti-multiculturalist 
protests that are in part motivated by a sense that migrants 
are living separately from local citizens, such as the 
xenophobic riots and attacks in South Africa in 2008 (and 
again in 2015 and 2017) (Mosselson, 2010). 
It is ironic that in some cases the expansion of migrants’ 
rights and/or of host-country citizenship could help address 
local anger at migrants’ perceived segregation. Partly in 
response to such concerns, some local authorities have 
developed local forms of citizenship based on residency 
(see Box 5).
Box 4: Discriminatory citizenship laws in Bhutan
The experience of ethnic Nepalis in Bhutan shows 
how regressive and discriminatory citizenship laws 
can be used as a pretext to deny human rights, and 
to marginalise and impoverish ethnic minorities, 
decades after any initial migration.  
In 1985, the Bhutanese Citizenship Act created 
an extremely narrow definition of citizenship that 
was deliberately used to exclude ethnic Nepalis 
(some 43% of the population). Authorities went 
even further than the Act stipulated, requiring 
Nepalis to prove residency in 1958 to qualify, 
even when they were already in possession of a 
citizenship card. Any Nepalis who could not do this 
were reclassified as ‘illegal immigrants’ and non-
nationals. 
These revisions led to growing unrest in southern 
Bhutan. By the mid-1990s, at least 106,000 refugees 
had fled to camps in Nepal, where they would spend 
the next 15 years. The ethnic Nepalis who remained 
in Bhutan were subject to frequent harassment, 
discrimination and marginalisation (Hutt, 2003).
In 2007, the US government announced its 
willingness to resettle Bhutanese refugees, with eight 
other resettlement countries joining them. By late 
2015, 100,000 had been resettled (Van Selm, 2013; 
Shrestha, 2015). There are still 10,000-12,000 
refugees in Nepal’s camps hoping for repatriation. 
While mass resettlement has helped the exiled 
Bhutanese, it has done so arguably at the expense of 
their claims to Bhutanese citizenship.
6 Relevance to the 2030 Agenda
SDG 16 promotes ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development’. Migration has played a role in 
making societies more diverse and inclusive, by creating 
opportunities for new social and cultural exchanges 
(Moran, 2011). This in turn can help increase innovation 
and fuel economic growth (Bove and Elia, 2017). However, 
a lack of permanent residency and/or citizenship can 
prevent migrants from becoming full members of society, 
for instance by limiting access to justice and services, and 
can create tension and conflict between migrant groups 
and host communities. Thus, if migration is not framed by 
inclusive citizenship policies, progress towards ‘peaceful 
and inclusive societies’ can be hindered. 
In direct contradiction to SDG 16.3, which calls 
for equal access to justice for all, non-citizens may 
struggle to be accorded equal treatment within the 
justice system, or may be unable to access legal aid to 
assist with representation. Similarly, long-term and/or 
second-generation migrants can be barred from political 
participation, which means decision-making is not 
fully representative at all levels, directly affecting the 
implementation of SDG 16.7 on responsive, inclusive, 
participatory and representative decision-making. Again, 
this can lead to disillusionment, frustration and tension 
amongst migrants, with implications for Goal 16 more 
generally.
Permanent residency and naturalisation processes 
are often opaque, bureaucratic and inefficient, making 
it harder for migrants to apply. This gives officials, who 
hold considerable administrative power to approve or 
deny applications, the opportunity to engage in corrupt 
behaviour. It can lead to frustration and disillusionment 
amongst applicants and potential tensions. As such, it 
affects the implementation of SDG 16.5 on reducing 
corruption and bribery, and that of SDG 16.6 on 
developing effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions, as well as the broader goal of ‘peaceful 
societies’.
Ensuring universal coverage of birth registration and 
legal identity in origin and host countries (SDG 16.9) is 
a vital first step in enabling migrants to access services 
and apply for citizenship or residency. Yet, globally only 
two-thirds of births are registered (Mikkelsen et al., 
2015). When migrants lack documentation or are unable 
to access citizenship, residency or legal status more 
generally (e.g. a work permit), they may resort to obtaining 
documents from informal markets (Vasta, 2011). This 
can jeopardise efforts to tackle organised crime, as set out 
in SDG 16.4. In fact, when pathways for legal migration 
become more restrictive, it can deflect migrants towards 
irregularity (Czaika and Hobolth, 2014), which hinders 
their integration into the host country, impeding progress 
towards SDG 16 more generally. Ensuring all migrants 
have access to legal identity documents issued by origin or 
host countries is key to combating trafficking by reducing 
migrants’ vulnerability (SDG 16.2). More broadly, when 
migrants, including second-generation migrants, cannot 
obtain citizenship or residency status, they are more 
vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers.
Citizenship and residency issues affect the 
implementation of a number of other SDG Targets. 
Eligibility to basic services (including health and education) 
and social protection is often tied to citizenship/residency, 
with undocumented migrants rarely eligible. This is often 
an issue for second-generation migrants who, despite 
being born in the country, are unable to gain citizenship 
or a more secure status. This means that progress towards 
the Goals on health, education and social protection 
(Targets 4.1, 4.3, 3.8, 1.3) is hampered. Furthermore, 
when migrants are excluded from accessing fundamental 
services such as health and education, they are prevented 
from becoming full members of society, hindering their 
integration. 
Box 5: Local citizenship initiatives
While most migration policies are set at the 
national level, it is increasingly common for cities 
at the frontline of migration to develop their own 
approaches to integrating people, including through 
processes that draw on the idea of citizenship as jus 
domicil, or ‘citizenship by residency’. In the US, for 
instance, both San Francisco and New York offer 
identity cards to all residents, regardless of legal 
status. Such inclusive practices are closely linked 
to the ‘sanctuary cities’ movement, in which local 
authorities limit their cooperation with federal 
immigration orders (Lee et al., 2017).
In Europe, since 1997 the city of Barcelona has 
been explicit about its ambition to grant equal 
citizenship to all persons based on ‘the acquisition 
of rights instead of the concept of nationality’ 
(Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1997), granting ‘the 
same citizen rights and duties to all persons living in 
Barcelona’ (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2012). 
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Table 1: Citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Relevant SDGs and Targets Link to migration
SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels 
Migration can contribute to making host countries more diverse and inclusive 
(Bove and Elia, 2017). 
Lack of citizenship/residency can prevent migrants from being full members of 
society, including access to services, and can lead to tensions and conflict. 
16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and 
torture of children
When migrants, including second-generation migrants, cannot obtain citizenship 
or residency status, they are more vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers.
16.3: Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure 
equal access to justice for all 
Non-citizens may struggle to be accorded equal treatment within the justice 
system, or may be unable to access legal aid.
16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen 
the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized 
crime
When permanent residency and/or citizenship cannot be obtained legally, 
migrants may resort to obtaining documents on the black market. There are 
well-recognised links between passport markets and organised crime.
16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms Permanent residency and naturalisation processes are often opaque, 
bureaucratic and inefficient, providing considerable opportunity for officials to 
engage in corrupt behaviour.
16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels As permanent residency and naturalisation processes can be difficult to 
navigate (see SDG 16.5), it is harder for migrants to apply and become full 
members of society.
16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-
making at all levels
When long-term migrants, and subsequent generations, settle permanently 
in large numbers and are barred from political participation as non-citizens, 
decision-making is not fully representative.
16.9: By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration Universal birth registration is a vital first step in ensuring that all children, 
including migrants’ children, are able to lay claim to the citizenships to which 
they are entitled. 
Proof of legal identity is vital to being able to apply for residency/citizenship.
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures 
for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor 
and the vulnerable
Migrants lacking permanent residency and/or citizenship status may not be 
able to access social protection (see Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017a). Furthermore, 
they can be prevented from accessing contributions made due to portability 
constraints (ibid). Tying eligibility for social protection to citizenship/residency 
hampers progress towards this target.
3.8: Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, 
access to quality essential healthcare services and access to safe, effective, 
quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all
Eligibility for health access is often tied to citizenship/residency status, with 
only some countries opening up (emergency) healthcare to all, regardless of 
status (see Tulloch et al., 2016). These eligibility requirements impede progress 
towards this target and full integration of migrants more generally.
4.1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality 
primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning 
outcomes
Education for migrant children is essential to meet SDG 4.1. Yet, eligibility for 
primary- and secondary-school education can be tied to citizenship/residency 
status, which means that migrant children can be prevented from accessing 
education, particularly those who are undocumented (see Nicolai et al., 2017). 
This often includes second-generation migrants.
Access to education is critical, because it plays an important role in social 
integration and economic mobility (ibid). Participation in education is also key 
to migrant children becoming fluent in the national language – an important 
enabling factor to ensure their integration.
4.3: By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and 
quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university
Access to vocational and tertiary education is often linked to citizenship/
residency status and  fees are sometimes higher for non-nationals. This can be 
especially critical for second-generation migrants. 
10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of 
people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed 
migration policies
Planned and well-managed migration must consider pathways to residency and 
citizenship.
7 Conclusions and policy recommendations
This briefing illustrates the numerous ways in which 
migrants’ access to permanent residency and/or citizenship 
can play a vital role in fostering peaceful and inclusive 
societies, as called for in SDG 16.  Migrants who lack 
secure permanent legal status may suffer a deprivation 
of other essential rights including access to justice, basic 
services and work. Opaque and arbitrary naturalisation 
processes – sometimes deliberately intended to exclude 
migrants – may contribute to official corruption and 
bribery.  Migrants’ lack of access to permanent residency 
and/or citizenship status can cement their political 
exclusion, resulting in their marginalisation. In the long 
term, discriminatory policies can foster civil unrest 
and even contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict, 
especially when they exclude second and subsequent 
generations of settled migrants.
In light of these findings, this briefing makes the 
following recommendations for national and local 
governments in host and origin countries, international 
institutions and civil-society organisations in order to make 
progress towards SDG 16.
Conclusion 1a: Giving migrants access to permanent 
residency and/or citizenship can foster peacefulness, 
inclusion and cohesion in host societies.
Conclusion 1b: Numerous barriers prevent long-term 
and second-generation migrants from accessing 
permanent residency and/or citizenship.  
Recommendation: Make pathways to permanent 
residency available to all long-term migrants.
 • Grant, presumptively, permanent residency status to 
all applicants who meet basic criteria (e.g. length of 
residency, proof of good conduct) so that long-term 
migrants are not required to keep renewing short-term 
visas.
 • This should not be contingent on meeting any ethnic, 
religious or other ascripitive criteria.
 • The international community should help countries 
with the highest ratios of migrants to locals –  especially 
forced migrants and refugees –  to find solutions that 
help address the particular burden these influxes can 
pose to social cohesion.
Recommendation: Make pathways to citizenship 
accessible to all long-term migrants who meet certain 
conditions.
 • Host governments, particularly those that require an 
excessively long period, should reduce the number of 
years’ residency required before an application for 
citizenship can be lodged.
 • Remove all categorical bars on citizenship acquisition, 
as these can foster tensions and conflict. Furthermore, 
make language requirements more flexible, particularly 
for older migrants. Remove citizenship tests for migrants 
with limited education, or offer them alternative, non-
written, means of demonstrating membership (e.g. 
community engagement).
 • Acquiring citizenship should not be contingent on the 
ability to pay. Host governments should lower fees for 
citizenship or introduce fee waivers for poor migrants. 
The US, for instance, extended a fee-waiver programme 
for naturalisation in 2016 (United States Citizen and 
Immigration Service (USCIS), 2017).  
 • Where the costs of processing citizenship applications 
present a significant burden for a host state (for 
example, mass refugee integration in a developing 
country), multilateral funding should be made available, 
to ensure timely and fair processing.
 • Naturalisation policies should include education 
and development components that also target local 
populations, to lessen prospective tensions. 
Recommendation: State and non-state actors should 
collaborate in creating programmes to provide 
migrants with the skills necessary to qualify both 
for formal citizenship and everyday practice of 
membership.
 • Such measures can include holding information sessions 
on adjusting to life in the host country, language lessons, 
facilitating entry to professional networks, setting up 
cultural mentorship programmes, and expanding access 
to microfinance programmes (Vieru, 2017). Portugal’s 
National Plan for the Integration of Migrants, for 
example, includes a holistic set of measures to help 
integration across language, employment, vocational 
training and housing (Juzwiak et al., 2014).
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Conclusion 2: Second-generation migrants are 
particularly affected by citizenship policies, which 
may exclude them from full membership of the 
communities in which they have lived all their lives.  
Recommendation: Second and subsequent 
generations of migrants should have automatic access 
to citizenship in their host communities.
 • Second-generation migrants should have an opportunity 
to register as permanent residents and/or citizens at 
birth. 
 • When it is not politically feasible to grant full citizenship 
at birth, states should provide second-generation 
migrants with opportunities to register for citizenship at 
an early date (e.g. as they enter school).
 • States should not ask second-generation migrants 
to complete a naturalisation process, which is often 
bureaucratic and prohibitively costly.
Recommendation: Host and origin country 
governments should remove any gender bars on 
citizenship that prevent women from passing on their 
citizenship to their children, and allow and facilitate 
the holding of multiple citizenships. 
 • Remove barriers that prevent emigrant citizens – 
particularly women married to non-citizens – from 
passing on their citizenship to their children. 
 • Lift legal and policy bars on holding multiple 
citizenships. This can help integration, as it means 
migrants do not have to choose one citizenship over 
others, and can foster business development and trade 
networks with origin countries.
Recommendation: Host and origin country 
governments should not deprive naturalised citizens 
or their descendants of their status arbitrarily, 
especially in cases where it would render them 
stateless.
 • Host and origin country governments that are not 
already signatories to the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (and the 1954 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons) should 
accede to these conventions.
Relevant SDG Targets
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection 
systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 
achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable. 
3.8: Achieve universal health coverage, including financial 
risk protection, access to quality essential health-care 
services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable 
essential medicines and vaccines for all. 
16.3: Promote the rule of law at the national and 
international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all. 
16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms 
flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets 
and combat all forms of organized crime.
16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their 
forms.
16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions at all levels,
Relevant SDG Targets
4.1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, 
equitable and quality primary and secondary education 
leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes. 
4.3: By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men 
to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary 
education, including university.
16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of 
violence against and torture of children. 
16.9: By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth 
registration.
Conclusion 3: A lack of access to citizenship/
residency can limit representative decision-
making, both increasing migrant communities’ 
marginalisation and hindering progress towards SDG 
16.7. 
Recommendation: Support local and regional 
identities and statuses as alternative and interim 
means of framing inclusion and providing important 
legal rights.
 • Governments, local authorities and private 
organisations should consider extending some rights 
normally reserved for citizens, in order to foster 
inclusion. With the consent of the local community, such 
measures could include voting in local or community 
elections. In particular, migrant parents of children who 
are permanent residents and/or citizens should be able 
to participate fully in decisions relating to education.
 • Work together to build reciprocal citizenship rights 
that allow migrants to travel, work and live long-term 
across broad regional blocs as regional citizens. The 
international community should seek to support these 
processes of inclusion and regional integration.
 • Cities should work on building local forms of 
membership (e.g. by providing citywide identity cards) 
that help strengthen everyday inclusion in communities 
and provide access to important services (e.g. access to 
banking facilities) for all residents, without reference to 
national legal status.
Many thanks to Pietro Mona (SDC), Nando Sigona (University of Birmingham), Alina Rocha Menocal and Helen Dempster (ODI) for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks to Sophy Kershaw for editing.
Relevant SDG Targets
16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and 
representative decision-making at all levels.
11.3: By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable 
urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and 
sustainable human settlement planning and management in 
all countries.
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